PLAYBOOK · P5 · OWASP Agentic AI v1.1
P5: Protecting HITL & Preventing Decision Fatigue Exploits
Keep human oversight effective when the agent fan-out tries to swamp it.
Goal: Prevent attackers from overloading human decision-makers, manipulating AI intent, or bypassing security through deceptive AI behaviours.
At a glance
Defence-in-depth chain
When reviewer overwhelm or decision-fatigue exploitation arrives, Proactive controls (a risk-prioritised review queue and adaptive workload balancing) preserve reviewer attention by routing low-risk decisions away from humans and throttling notification volume. If a manipulative or high-volume request still reaches a reviewer, Reactive controls (reviewer decision summaries and plan-vs-goal validation) make the decision legible and validate goal consistency before approval. Detective controls (Sigstore signing) produce cryptographic audit trails of reviewer overrides for post-incident review.
proactiveStep 1: Optimize HITL workflows & reduce decision fatigue
Score each pending agent action by risk and use that score to rank the HITL review queue so reviewers tackle the highest-impact decisions first.
Automate routine low-risk approvals and escalate only high-impact decisions to a human reviewer.
Cap the volume of AI-generated notifications per reviewer per hour to prevent cognitive overload.
Helmwart controls:Adaptive loadEnforce rate limits on agent-generated notifications, approval requests, and alerts to block decision-fatigue-as-an-attack-vector.
Require two-agent consensus before any agent is permitted to modify its own operational goals.
Surface a plain-language explanation of each pending decision alongside the agent's recommendation so reviewers can act without re-reading raw logs.
Helmwart controls:Decision summariesDistribute the review queue across available human reviewers so no single operator is presented with an unmanageable volume.
Helmwart controls:Adaptive loadStrip or sandbox all clickable links and rich content in agent output so social-engineering payloads cannot complete a click-through to the attacker.
Helmwart controls:Render restrictionProvide a documented, tested kill-switch covering single-agent, fleet, and global scopes with a named authority and drill cadence.
Helmwart controls:Kill switchFor irreversible high-stakes changes such as payments or production configuration writes, require confirmation through a channel independent of the agent.
Helmwart controls:OOB verifyFor irreversible high-impact actions, require two distinct human reviewers to independently approve and sign off before the agent proceeds.
Helmwart controls:Dual control
reactiveStep 2: Identify AI-induced human manipulation
Validate each pending agent plan against its declared goal before approving execution to detect and block unintended behavioural shifts.
Monitor how frequently each agent requests goal changes and alert when the rate suggests active manipulation rather than legitimate adaptation.
Helmwart controls:Divergence monitorScan agent outputs and tool-call parameters for PII, secrets, and sensitive IP before egress so phishing payloads cannot reach the end user.
Helmwart controls:Egress DLP
detectiveStep 3: Strengthen AI decision traceability & logging
Write every HITL decision and agent recommendation to a cryptographically signed, append-only log to prevent post-hoc tampering.
Run real-time anomaly detection across the agent decision stream and escalate sessions that deviate from expected patterns.
Helmwart controls:Anomaly isolationLog every human override of an agent recommendation and surface reviewer-pattern analytics to detect bias or systematic misalignment.
Flag decision reversals in high-risk workflows where a previously rejected AI output was later approved under suspicious conditions.
Helmwart controls:Cross-system audit
Source
OWASP Agentic AI: Threats and Mitigations v1.1 (Dec 2025), §Mitigation Strategies. Action text is taken verbatim or paraphrased from the canonical document; the Helmwart additions are the per-action mappings onto deployable mitigation entries.
Source and licence
- OWASP Agentic AI — Threats and Mitigations ↗ · v1.1, December 2025
Parts of this page are adapted from OWASP Agentic AI — Threats and Mitigations v1.1, December 2025. Because that work is licensed CC BY-SA 4.0, this page is distributed under CC BY-SA 4.0 as well. CC BY-SA 4.0