REFERENCE · UPSTREAM

Sources where this catalog comes from

Helmwart draws its base T1–T17 entries from the OWASP Agentic Security Initiative catalog and its normalized MAS scenario extensions from the OWASP MAS Guide, which applies the Cloud Security Alliance's MAESTRO framework. The OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications 2026 is a practitioner-format on-ramp. MITRE ATLAS is included as a downstream pivot. Per-mitigation upstream docs are catalogued separately in research/RESOURCES.md.

OWASP Agentic AI – Threats and Mitigations v1.1 (Dec 2025) defines T1–T17. The older MAS Threat Modelling Guide v1.0 (Apr 2025) applies MAESTRO to worked systems and reuses some extended IDs for system-specific variants. Helmwart provides stable normalized entries and renumbers the colliding RPA T16 / T17 entries to T48 / T49.

A Primary frameworks

OWASP Agentic AI · Threats & Mitigations v1.1 · Dec 2025

Primary taxonomy of agentic threats T1–T17 plus named attack scenarios per threat.

What we use: Drives the threat IDs, names, definitions, and mitigation associations across this site.

last checked 2026-05-11 visit ↗
OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications 2026 v2026 · Dec 2025

Top-10 format on-ramp (ASI01–ASI10) over the T1–T17 catalog. Appendix A cross-walks every entry to LLM Top 10, T-numbers, and AIVSS core risks.

What we use: Drives the Top 10 grid on the Frameworks page and the "covered by" badges on threat detail pages.

last checked 2026-05-11 visit ↗
OWASP MAS Guide applying CSA MAESTRO v1.0 · Apr 2025

Applies the Cloud Security Alliance MAESTRO framework to MAS scenarios and records extended threat scenarios.

What we use: Drives the seven-layer model, cross-layer band, agentic factors, and normalized MAS scenario entries on the Frameworks page.

last checked 2026-05-11 visit ↗
OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025 v2025 · published 2024

LLM01–LLM10 covering injection, supply-chain, output handling, agency, system-prompt leakage, and unbounded consumption at the LLM application layer.

What we use: Per-threat cross-walk: each agentic threat detail page links the matching LLM01–LLM10 entries so practitioners can pivot between the agentic and the LLM-app frames.

last checked 2026-05-11 visit ↗
OWASP AI Exchange: General Controls living document

Named control IDs (#AI PROGRAM, #SEC PROGRAM, #LEAST MODEL PRIVILEGE, #OVERSIGHT, #UNWANTED BIAS TESTING, …) that map to mitigation classes Helmwart recommends.

What we use: Mitigation pages cite the matching OWASP AI Exchange control ID so readers can pivot to the wider AI-application security taxonomy.

last checked 2026-05-12 visit ↗
NIST SP 800-207: Zero Trust Architecture v1.0 · Aug 2020

Seven tenets of Zero Trust; the PE / PA / PEP (Policy Engine / Policy Administrator / Policy Enforcement Point) model; non-perimeter access patterns.

What we use: Canonical reference for identity, privilege, and inter-agent-communication mitigations (m-spiffe, m-rbac-abac, m-message-signing, m-token-lifetime, m-time-bound-priv).

last checked 2026-05-12 visit ↗
NIST AI 100-1: AI Risk Management Framework 1.0 v1.0 · Jan 2023

Govern / Map / Measure / Manage functions for AI risk; "stop-build authority"; third-party oversight.

What we use: Governance backbone for mitigations addressing policy enforcement, oversight, anomaly detection, and continuous validation.

last checked 2026-05-12 visit ↗
NIST AI 600-1: Generative AI Risk Profile v1.0 · Jul 2024

Twelve GAI risk categories (Confabulation, Information Integrity, Information Security, Value Chain Integration, …), each with Govern/Map/Measure/Manage actions.

What we use: Standards-grounded cross-walk for hallucination, supply-chain, memory, and output-moderation controls.

last checked 2026-05-12 visit ↗
NSA / CISA / Five Eyes: Careful Adoption of Agentic AI Services Apr 2026

Joint government guidance: five agentic-AI risk categories (Privilege, Design & Configuration, Behavioral, Structural, Accountability) with concrete deployment recommendations.

What we use: Cited on mitigation pages addressing privilege scoping, identity, observability, and cascading-failure containment.

last checked 2026-05-12 visit ↗
Red Hat: Zero Trust for Autonomous Agentic AI Systems Feb 2026

Four practical Zero-Trust principles applied to agents: scoped identity + contextual authz, delegated token exchange (RFC 8693), continuous verification + audit, workload attestation.

What we use: Implementation-oriented citation for SPIFFE, message signing, MFA-on-high-priv, NHI lifecycle, and time-bound privilege mitigations.

last checked 2026-05-12 visit ↗
MITRE ATLAS v5.6.0 · living KB

Adversarial tactics & techniques against AI/ML systems (AML.TXXXX IDs). External to OWASP; not referenced by the Top 10 2026, only briefly cited in the T1–T17 catalog.

What we use: Per-threat external pivot: where a T-number has a concrete adversary technique catalogued in ATLAS, the technique ID surfaces on the threat card. T8 has no clean ATLAS match; T7/T10 use loose pivots noted on each page.

last checked 2026-05-11 visit ↗

B Cross-reference map

Every Helmwart threat row mapped to its source family, MAESTRO layer, and ATLAS counterpart where available. Click a column header to sort. Em-dash where no mapping exists.

Helmwart Title Source family MAESTRO layer(s) MITRE ATLAS
T1 Memory Poisoning T1 L1 · L2 · CL AML.T0020 · AML.T0070 · AML.T0080 · AML.T0080.000
T2 Tool Misuse T2 L3 · CL AML.T0053 · AML.T0086 · AML.T0110
T3 Privilege Compromise T3 L4 · L6 · CL AML.T0012 · AML.T0055 · AML.T0083 · AML.T0098
T4 Resource Overload T4 L4 · CL AML.T0029 · AML.T0034 · AML.T0034.002 · AML.T0046
T5 Cascading Hallucination Attacks T5 L3 · CL AML.T0031 · AML.T0060 · AML.T0062
T6 Intent Breaking and Goal Manipulation T6 L3 · CL AML.T0051 · AML.T0051.001 · AML.T0054 · AML.T0065
T7 Misaligned and Deceptive Behaviours T7 L1 · L6 · CL AML.T0067 · AML.T0067.000 · AML.T0077
T8 Repudiation and Untraceability T8 L5 · CL n/a
T9 Identity Spoofing and Impersonation T9 L7 · CL AML.T0073 · AML.T0074 · AML.T0088
T10 Overwhelming Human-in-the-Loop (HITL) T10 L5 AML.T0046 · AML.T0080
T11 Unexpected RCE and Code Attacks T11 L3 · L4 AML.T0049 · AML.T0050 · AML.T0072 · AML.T0102
T12 Agent Communication Poisoning T12 L2 · CL AML.T0080 · AML.T0080.000
T13 Rogue Agents in Multi-Agent Systems T13 L4 · L7 · CL AML.T0061 · AML.T0081 · AML.T0110
T14 Human Attacks on Multi-Agent Systems T14 L4 · L7 · CL AML.T0073 · AML.T0053 · AML.T0086
T15 Human Manipulation T15 L7 · CL AML.T0052 · AML.T0067 · AML.T0067.000 · AML.T0077
T16 Insecure Inter-Agent Protocol Abuse T16 L3 · L7 · CL AML.T0073 · AML.T0074 · AML.T0080
T17 Supply Chain Compromise T17 L1 · L2 · L3 AML.T0010 · AML.T0019 · AML.T0058 · AML.T0109
T18 RAG Input Manipulation Leading to Policy Bypass MAS-derived L2 AML.T0051.001 · AML.T0070 · AML.T0080
T19 Unintended Workflow Execution MAS-derived L3 AML.T0053 · AML.T0081 · AML.T0067
T20 Framework Vulnerability Leading to Code Injection MAS-derived L3 AML.T0049 · AML.T0050 · AML.T0072
T21 Inconsistent Workflow State MAS-derived L3 AML.T0053 · AML.T0081
T22 Service Account Exposure MAS-derived L4 AML.T0055 · AML.T0083 · AML.T0012
T23 Selective Log Manipulation MAS-derived L5 AML.T0081 · AML.T0046
T24 Dynamic Policy Enforcement Failure MAS-derived L6 AML.T0012 · AML.T0081 · AML.T0067
T25 Workflow Disruption via Dependency Exploitation MAS-derived L7 AML.T0029 · AML.T0034 · AML.T0046
T26 Model Instability Leading to Inconsistent Blockchain Interactions MAS-derived L1 AML.T0031 · AML.T0067
T27 Vector Database Poisoning with Malicious Smart Contract Data MAS-derived L2 AML.T0070 · AML.T0051.001 · AML.T0080
T28 RAG Data Exfiltration MAS-derived L2 AML.T0085 · AML.T0086 · AML.T0012
T29 Plugin Vulnerability Leading to Agent Compromise MAS-derived L3 AML.T0010 · AML.T0110 · AML.T0109
T30 Insecure Inter-Agent Communication Protocol MAS-derived L3 AML.T0073 · AML.T0080 · AML.T0051
T31 Insufficient Isolation Between Agent Actions MAS-derived L3 AML.T0053 · AML.T0086 · AML.T0110
T32 Runaway Agent on Solana MAS-derived L3 AML.T0034 · AML.T0034.002 · AML.T0029
T33 Blockchain Reorganisation Attack (Indirect) MAS-derived L4 AML.T0031 · AML.T0067
T34 Wallet Key Compromise MAS-derived L4 AML.T0055 · AML.T0083 · AML.T0073
T35 Manipulation of Proof of Sampling (PoSP) MAS-derived L5 AML.T0081 · AML.T0067
T36 Smart Contract Vulnerability Leading to Agent Impersonation MAS-derived L6 AML.T0073 · AML.T0049 · AML.T0074
T37 Cross-Chain Bridge Attack (Indirect) MAS-derived L7 AML.T0010 · AML.T0109 · AML.T0049
T38 Emergent Collusion on Blockchain MAS-derived L7 AML.T0061 · AML.T0081 · AML.T0031
T39 Unintended Resource Consumption via MCP MAS-derived L3 AML.T0034.002 · AML.T0029 · AML.T0053
T40 MCP Client Impersonation MAS-derived L3 AML.T0073 · AML.T0012 · AML.T0055
T41 Schema Mismatch Leading to Errors MAS-derived L3 AML.T0067 · AML.T0031
T42 Cross-Client Interference via Shared Server MAS-derived L3 AML.T0080 · AML.T0053 · AML.T0073
T43 Network Exposure of MCP Server MAS-derived L4 AML.T0049 · AML.T0012
T44 Insufficient Logging in MCP Server / Client MAS-derived L5 AML.T0046 · AML.T0081
T45 Insufficient Isolation of MCP Server Permissions MAS-derived L6 AML.T0012 · AML.T0055 · AML.T0098
T46 Data Residency / Compliance Violation via MCP Server MAS-derived L6 AML.T0085 · AML.T0086
T47 Rogue MCP Server in Ecosystem MAS-derived L7 AML.T0074 · AML.T0110 · AML.T0109 · AML.T0058
T48 Model Inconsistency Leading to Variable Approvals MAS-derived L1 AML.T0031 · AML.T0065
T49 Semantic Drift in Expense Policy Embeddings MAS-derived L2 AML.T0070 · AML.T0020 · AML.T0080

C Editorial policy & versioning

Helmwart is an interpretive layer over upstream material. We preserve OWASP T1–T17, normalize conflicting MAS scenario IDs for site navigation, and apply MAESTRO/ATLAS cross-references editorially. We add (a) a graph runtime that suggests which threats apply to an architecture, (b) prose tying threats to mitigations with current sources, and (c) editorial primers.

This is not a substitute for security review. Use the canvas as a structured way to enumerate likely threats; use it as input to a real security review, not in place of one.

Catalog version
0.2.0
Last review
2026-05-11
Cadence
Quarterly + on every upstream release
License
Content and code CC BY-SA 4.0 (matching upstream OWASP)
Per-mitigation sources
research/RESOURCES.md

D Agentic security: principles & research

The primary and case-study references behind the security design principles page. Grouped; all verified against live sources, May 2026.