Blank canvas
Start from nothing. Drag in agents, memory, tools, externals, and humans from the palette.
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Start from nothing. Drag in agents, memory, tools, externals, and humans from the palette.
10-agent consumer fintech: chat and voice frontends, an autonomous orchestrator, a policy/compliance reviewer, and specialists for accounts, transactions, fraud, recommendations, and support. An MCP tool bus and a HITL gate sit between the agent fleet and external KYC / payments / banking APIs.
A single chat agent backed by a user-uploaded document corpus and live web fetch. Designed to surface the EchoLeak-style Lethal Trifecta on the simplest possible system.
A user-facing chat agent backed by a RAG knowledge store, a ticket-system API the agent writes to, and a human escalation gate. Untrusted user input flows into a RAG-and-write-capable agent under partial-provenance memory and an unsigned audit log.
A single third-party MCP server exposes shell and write-capable tools to multiple client agents through one shared protocol channel. Concentrates descriptor-injection, cross-client interference, and third-party trust-anchor risk on one server.
RPA agent that extracts, validates (via policy RAG), and routes expense claims. Matches the OWASP MAS Guide §3 worked threat model. Open the case study for the full per-layer threat list.
An ElizaOS-style agent system: multi-LLM, plugin tool bus, Solana blockchain integration, multi-platform clients. Matches the OWASP MAS Guide §4 worked threat model. Runaway-loop, wallet-key compromise, and plugin-vulnerability scenarios all surface on this graph.
An MCP host (Claude Desktop / IDE) with multiple MCP Clients each connecting to a distinct MCP Server, mapping to the OWASP MAS Guide §5 worked threat model. Surfaces protocol-abuse, schema-mismatch, network-exposure, and rogue-server scenarios.
Patient management with regulated data flowing through specialist agents into the EHR. Repudiation, identity spoofing, and overreliance dominate.
Code-execution scope, supply-chain risk, prompt injection from repository content. Sandbox is the centerpiece control.
| # | Template | Status | Agents | Edges | Findings | Trifecta | Frameworks | Action |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 00 | Blank canvas Start from nothing. Drag in agents, memory, tools, externals, and humans from the palette. | Ready | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Open → | |
| 01 | Consumer Fintech 10-agent consumer fintech: chat and voice frontends, an autonomous orchestrator, a policy/compliance reviewer, and specialists for accounts, transactions, fraud, recommendations, and support. An MCP tool bus and a HITL gate sit between the agent fleet and external KYC / payments / banking APIs. | Ready | 10 | 40 | 29 | 1 | MAESTROOWASP | Open → |
| 02 | Personal RAG assistant A single chat agent backed by a user-uploaded document corpus and live web fetch. Designed to surface the EchoLeak-style Lethal Trifecta on the simplest possible system. | Ready | 1 | 5 | 9 | 1 | ATLASOWASP | Open → |
| 03 | Customer Support Automation A user-facing chat agent backed by a RAG knowledge store, a ticket-system API the agent writes to, and a human escalation gate. Untrusted user input flows into a RAG-and-write-capable agent under partial-provenance memory and an unsigned audit log. | Ready | 1 | 6 | 12 | 0 | OWASP | Open → |
| 04 | MCP-based tool server A single third-party MCP server exposes shell and write-capable tools to multiple client agents through one shared protocol channel. Concentrates descriptor-injection, cross-client interference, and third-party trust-anchor risk on one server. | Ready | 2 | 13 | 20 | 0 | MAESTROOWASP | Open → |
| 05 | RPA: Expense Reimbursement RPA agent that extracts, validates (via policy RAG), and routes expense claims. Matches the OWASP MAS Guide §3 worked threat model. Open the case study for the full per-layer threat list. | Ready | 3 | 15 | 15 | 1 | MAESTROOWASP | Open → |
| 06 | ElizaOS (Web3 agent OS) An ElizaOS-style agent system: multi-LLM, plugin tool bus, Solana blockchain integration, multi-platform clients. Matches the OWASP MAS Guide §4 worked threat model. Runaway-loop, wallet-key compromise, and plugin-vulnerability scenarios all surface on this graph. | Ready | 2 | 12 | 32 | 2 | MAESTROOWASP | Open → |
| 07 | Anthropic MCP: host + multiple servers An MCP host (Claude Desktop / IDE) with multiple MCP Clients each connecting to a distinct MCP Server, mapping to the OWASP MAS Guide §5 worked threat model. Surfaces protocol-abuse, schema-mismatch, network-exposure, and rogue-server scenarios. | Ready | 1 | 12 | 21 | 1 | MAESTROOWASP | Open → |
| 08 | Healthcare diagnostic Patient management with regulated data flowing through specialist agents into the EHR. Repudiation, identity spoofing, and overreliance dominate. | Phase 2 | · | · | · | · | HIPAA | |
| 09 | SDLC / coding agents Code-execution scope, supply-chain risk, prompt injection from repository content. Sandbox is the centerpiece control. | Phase 2 | · | · | · | · |